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Abstract: Responses to a questionnaire survey received from PFI financiers, and interviews with senior 
managers, show that as the credit crunch took hold banks became more risk averse.  The prediction of 
Toms et al. that collusion between the state and the private sector might cease in the face of austerity 
does not appear to have occurred. Rather the state has intervened to benefit the private sector. We 
argue that two successive UK Governments intervened in the market to protect the role of private 
finance in PFIs but whether such interventions represent value for taxpayers' money is a question for 
future research. 
 
Response to Reviewers: A changing market for PFI financing: evidence from the financiers 
 
REVIEWER’S COMMENTS: 
This is an interesting article with lots of promise. Its main arguments are that the financial / banking 
crisis had the potential to disrupt the PFI financing model in the UK which depends upon bank bond 
financing. This article takes the position that the banking crisis was less disruptive that might have 
been and this was because the UK government intervened to guarantee bond financing arrangements. 
The author(s) then employ a survey and response to questionnaires to take a 'financiers' view of the 
PFI funding model and use these responses to assess the extent to which the PFI funding model is 
disrupted or at risk. 
 
AUTHORS’ REPLY: 
Thank you for this supportive comment, and for the helpful suggestions and links below. 
 
 
I have a number of issues with the paper which are about structure and setting things up first of all. 
That is what is the objective of the paper and how is it generally structured needs tidying up 
 
Section 1 on the Nature and development of PFI 
 
I would like the authors to set up the introduction more powerfully. The first thing is the growth in UK 
PFI projects and funding details and charts showing growth in PFI. Also the projected on-going PFI 
costs to UK Government (unitary charge) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/267590/PU1587_fi
nal.pdf 
 
AUTHORS’ REPLY: 
We have rewritten the introduction, and explained the impact of the credit crunch on the European 
PPP market.  
The significance of UK PPPs in Europe has been highlighted in section 2.   
 
 
Government departments can use PFI to leverage up their budgets without using their allotted capital 
budget—the investment is additional and not budgeted for. 
In a typical PFI project, the private sector party is constituted as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which 
manages and finances the design, build and operation of a new facility. The financing of the initial 
capital investment (i.e. the capital required to pay transaction costs, buy land and build the 
infrastructure) is provided by a combination of share capital and loan stock from the owners of the 
SPV, together with senior debt from banks or bond-holders. The return on both equity and debt capital 
is sourced from the periodic "unitary charge", which is paid by the public authority from the point at 
which the contracted facility is available for use. 
 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtreasy/1146/1146.pdf 
 
We need to have something on the finance structure of PFIs in terms of the use of SPVs and the typical 
leverage ratio (debt to equity funding). See NAO report 2012 for the cost structure of an average PFI.  
 
Point about PFI as being highly leveraged which allows investors (equity) to take large profits when 
they sell on and exit from contracts. So authors also introduce the nature of the 'secondary market' 
 
AUTHORS’ REPLY: 
We have explained the structure of a typical PFI project by drawing from the House of Commons 
Treasury (2011) report. The deliberate use of high leverage to maximise return on equity has been 
noted.  
 
 
What is P2 and how is this designed to limit leverages returns to equity holders The structure of PF2 
curbs the ability of primary investors to generate excessive profits and, consequently, the potential for 
windfall gains on secondary market sales through measures including a mechanism to share unutilised 
funds in the lifecycle reserve, the removal of soft services where contractors have typically included a 
risk premium in the pricing and the introduction of public sector equity 
 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/205112/pf2_infras
tructure_new_approach_to_public_private_parnerships_051212.pdf 
 
AUTHORS’ REPLY: 
We have discussed the 2010 Conservative-Liberal government’s new approach to PFI in terms of its 
aspirations to curb down private sector profits, immediately after discussing the use of SPV to manage 
risks and use of leverage to maximise equity returns.  
 
 
Section 3 Factors limiting/challenging the sustainability of PFI  
 
A]  The banking crisis and the role of bank finance: supply of funding and interest spreads 
Quotes and data from surveys here 
Response ..Government interventions to secure funding 
B]  The secondary market windfall gains and profits extraction ..Evidence on this  
Response…PF2 -what is this and why these regulations introduced 
C] The fact that accounting regulations have changed and so PFI risks are back on the 
Governments balance sheet (more on this) 
D] Austerity packages are not yet implemented and budget cuts of up to 20 per cent envisaged 
See table 2.11 
http://cdn.budgetresponsibility.org.uk/41298-OBR-accessible.pdf 
 Problem is that PFI is split variable between departments (some more will be more or less 
affected by austerity cutbacks) 
 Also Governments versus local authority responsibility 
 And variability in terms of capital and service cost arrangements 
 
AUTHORS’ REPLY: 
We have restructured the paper as you suggest to focus on the factors challenging the sustainability of 
PFI. This is now section 4 which has four sub-sections and specified areas of government intervention. 
Thank you in particular for the link to the PBR report which was helpful.   
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A changing market for PFI financing: evidence from the financiers 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Responses to a questionnaire survey received from PFI financiers, and interviews with senior 
managers, show that as the credit crunch took hold banks became more risk averse.  The 
prediction of Toms et al. that collusion between the state and the private sector might cease in 
the face of austerity does not appear to have occurred. Rather the state has intervened to 
benefit the private sector. We argue that two successive UK Governments intervened in the 
market to protect the role of private finance in PFIs but whether such interventions represent 
value for taxpayers‟ money is a question for future research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: PFI financing, credit crunch, financiers, risk transfer, UK 
 
 
*Manuscript (with Author Details removed)
Click here to view linked References
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
2 
 
A changing market for PFI financing: evidence from the financiers 
1. Introduction 
For many years, the UK has been a leading proponent of policy initiatives that encourage the 
use of private finance and the involvement of private companies in the delivery of public 
infrastructure and some related services.  Internationally similar policies have been developed 
in many countries, although the precise nature of the public-private partnership (PPP) or 
private finance initiative (PFI) arrangements, by which the policy is generally delivered, does 
vary across countries.   
Before the credit crunch the global PPP/PFI market was growing substantially. In 
Europe the value of PPP transactions that reached financial close was approximately €29.6 
billion in 2008, with 136 projects signed (Kappeler and Nemoz, 2010: 7; Burke and Demirag, 
2015). This growth was supported by what Tom‟s et al., drawing on Miliband (1969), 
describes as collusion between “loose alliances of monopoly capitalists and monopoly 
regulators” (Toms et al., 2011: 671). An entire public services industry grew up, which 
lobbied intensively and spent significant sums to create a sympathetic environment amongst 
politicians of all parties for more private involvement in public services (Gosling, 2008).  But 
the credit crunch and the recession that followed led Toms et al (2011) to ask whether 
political and fiscal momentum might be mobilised to stop that pattern of collusion.   
 During the credit crunch the value and number of PPP transactions that reached 
financial close declined substantially (Refer to figure 1). A recent report by the European PPP 
Expertise Centre (EPEC, 2013) confirmed that in 2012 the volume of PPP activity was at its 
lowest level for 10 years. The value of deals that reached financial close was just €11.7 
billion, with the transport sector accounting for the majority of such investment (EPEC, 
2013).  Post 2012, the European PPP market started to recover. In 2014, the aggregate value 
of PPP transactions which reached financial close in the European market grew to €18.7 
billion, a 15% increase over 2013 (€16.3 billion), with 82 PPP transactions reaching financial 
close (80 deals closed in 2013) (EPEC, 2014).  
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Figure 1: European PPP/PFI market 2005-2014 by value and number of projects 
 
Source: EPEC (2014, p.1) http://www.eib.org/epec/epec_market_update_2014_en.pdf 
 
 
In practice, the economic environment reduced the global market for PPP finance especially 
senior debt and bond finance. The start of the financial crisis immediately created 
uncertainties in the PPP industry, to which governments responded.  In the UK, governments 
made frequent interventions into the PFI financing market to improve investor confidence 
(Broadbent et al., 2008).  Due to the shortages of private finance, paradoxically, the 
Government was compelled to release public money to support PFI projects (House of 
Commons, 2009).  For example, the Infrastructure Finance Unit (IFU) provided £120m to 
complete a £582m waste project. This intervention was deemed to be successful as the NAO 
(2010) argued that HM Treasury‟s willingness to lend, improved market confidence to the 
extent that in the following 12 month period 35 new deals were signed without further loans 
from the IFU.  However, this optimism has not lasted and the government still perceives that 
there is a shortage of capacity in the market, leading to various initiatives including changes 
in its policies on risk transfer (HM Treasury, 2012).  All of this is aimed at making the 
various forms of PPP/PFI more attractive to private investors.   
Hence this paper‟s objectives are to briefly outline firstly, the nature and development 
of the private finance market in the UK. Secondly, it outlines the challenges in this market 
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place that threatened the sustainability of PFI and which led to interventions from two 
governments (Labour until May 2010 and subsequently the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrats Coalition) aimed at propping up a means of providing public services to which all 
are ideologically committed perhaps as a credit rationing avoidance strategy (Toms et al., 
2011). Thirdly, the paper investigates how these changes affected the financiers‟ perceptions 
of risk.  
This paper contributes to the PFI financing literature (Asenova and Beck, 2003, 2009, 
2010; Demirag et al., 2011, 2012), which identifies finance capital as the driver of the private 
finance policy whereby the nation state acts as broker (Armstrong, 2006; Asenova and Beck, 
2010).  We examine how financiers perceive the turbulent market through a questionnaire 
survey and interviews. Whereas prior studies often focus on case studies in specific sectors or 
rely upon a relatively small number of interviews, the questionnaire survey has wider 
coverage.  Moreover, this study focusses on the perception of financiers and differentiates 
between different forms of equity and debt investors, because they have differing 
characteristics and have been subjected to different forms of pressures post credit crunch. 
This paper is organised as follows. The next (second) section explains the nature and 
development of PFI in the UK. The third section explains the research methods. The fourth 
section presents the findings. It provides insights into the repercussion of the crisis on the PFI 
market and examines the interventions made by governments to prop up this market. It also 
discusses how the financiers perceived the changing PFI market.  The final section concludes 
the paper.  
 
2. The nature and development of PFI in the UK 
PPP in the UK commonly takes the form of PFI, under which the relationships between the 
public sector procurer and private sector contractors are characterised and managed by legally 
binding long-term contracts for the infrastructure and underlying facilities management 
services. The UK is the biggest player in the European PPP market, as Figure 2 shows, both 
in terms of value and number of projects - 24 transactions closed in 2014 (compared to 31 in 
2013) with a value of about EUR 6.6 billion (EUR 6 billion in 2013).  
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Figure 2: Country breakdown by value and number of transactions in 2014 
 
Source: EPEC (2014, p.2) http://www.eib.org/epec/epec_market_update_2014_en.pdf 
 
In a typical PFI project, the procuring authority signs a contract for 30 years or more with a 
private sector partner which is constituted as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to design, 
build, finance and operate a new facility (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2011). To 
limit the risks to the amount of equity subscribed by the investors, each PFI project is 
delivered via a SPV established by the private sector consortium, which won the contract in a 
tender bidding process. In the early days, the equity raised typically comprised 1% pure 
equity and some 9% subordinated debt. Typically the remainder comprised senior debt from 
banks or bond-holders (NAO, 2012; Demirag et al., 2012).  
The SPV, which is usually a shell company, sub-contracts the tasks of the project to 
companies that are usually related companies of the consortium members. These sub-
contractors have the range of skills needed to design build and operate the infrastructure and 
to provide selected related services.  The consortium will usually establish relationships with 
one or more bank or bond-holders to provide the debt capital.  The debt holders will sign a 
separate financing agreement with the public procurer, which will allow them step-in rights to 
protect the debt capital in the event that a contractor fails (Demirag et al., 2011). 
Payment is a deferred mechanism over the lifetime of the project.  Once the facilities 
are available for use, the procuring authority makes a single annual payment, known as a 
unitary charge, to cover the capital and revenue costs as well as the financing costs. The fact 
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that the SPV is highly leveraged often allows the equity partners to make large returns on 
their equity investments, and take large profits when they sell on and exit from PFI contracts. 
Equity financiers do not exclusively rely on dividends and profits from the SPV to generate 
returns. They also generate profits by sub-contracting building and facilities management 
work to their related group of companies. 
The PFI policy was first announced in 1992, but did not really begin to have an effect 
on service or infrastructure delivery until after a change of government in 1997.  Since that 
time and until the start of the financial crisis the policy expanded rapidly both in terms of 
numbers and value of projects. As figure 3 shows, after a gentle start the number of deals and 
their capital value rose fairly steadily to a peak in 2003-04, maintained a lower but substantial 
level for three years, and then peaked again in 2007-08.  Thereafter, as the financial crisis 
took effect the trend is substantially downwards.  Nevertheless by March 2014, there were in 
total 728 current projects with a combined capital value of some £57 billion.   
 
Figure 3: Number of projects reaching financial close and total capital values incurred 
for current projects 
 
Source: HM Treasury (2014, p.8) 
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The projects are unevenly spread across departments.  As of March 2013, Table 1 shows that 
The Department of Health has been the biggest source of projects by capital value, although 
The Department of Education has the most projects.  However, these statistics only include 
projects that are current on that date, so that they exclude projects that were signed but were 
subsequently terminated.  For example, the terminated London Underground project with a 
capital value of £16 billion significantly increases the value of projects signed by the 
Transport department.   
Despite the fall in new activity over the period since 2007-08, the annual revenue 
spending continues to rise.  For example, the UK‟s estimated future payments are expected to 
carry on rising well into the middle of the 21
st
 Century as new projects come on stream (HM 
Treasury, 2007&2009).  
 
Table 1: Total value of current PFI projects across government as at 31 March 2014 
Department  Number of 
projects 
Capital Value 
(£m) 
Cabinet Office  1 6.7 
Crown Prosecution Service  1 18.2 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills  1 21.8 
Department for Communities and Local Government  74 2728.9 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport  17 348.9 
Department for Education  168 7799.5 
Department for Energy and Climate Change  1 5.5 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs  30 4073.2 
Department for Transport  62 7878.8 
Department for Work and Pensions  3 1102.7 
Department of Health  123 12082.9 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  1 17.1 
GCHQ  1 331.0 
HM Revenue and Customs  8 862.1 
HM Treasury  1 141.0 
Home Office  28 1047.9 
Ministry of Defence  41 9042. 
Ministry of Justice  23 798.6 
Northern Ireland Executive  38 1985.1 
Scottish Government  83 5690.0 
Welsh Government  23 566.7 
Total  728 56549.5 
Source: HM Treasury (2014, pp.9-10) 
  
PFI was revised (in the form of PF2) by the 2010 Conservative-Liberal coalition 
government with the stated intention that this would limit the returns to equity partners and 
enable the public sector to share the equity returns.  The intention was that PF2 should limit 
the ability of equity investors to generate excessive profits and, consequently, the potential 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
8 
 
for windfall gains on secondary market sales. Measures to achieve these aims included a 
mechanism to share unutilised funds in the lifecycle reserve, the removal of soft services 
where contractors have typically included a risk premium in the pricing and the introduction 
of public sector equity (HM Treasury, 2012). 
 
3. Research methods  
This study uses data collected from a survey of and interviews with PFI financiers. Drawing 
on the database of PFI projects provided by Partnerships UK, we identified one hundred and 
nine financial organisations, including equity financiers, banks that normally provide senior 
debt and bond holders whose loans may be cheaper than senior debt for the biggest projects.  
Initially, the survey was designed based on a literature review, government publications on 
PFI (e.g. HM Treasury, 2003a&b) and pilot interviews. Feedback from academics, 
consultants, and debt and equity financiers led to a revision. The questionnaire instrument 
was administered in July 2008. Non-respondents were followed up in October 2008. A 
response rate of 39.4% was achieved with 43 usable responses from debt and equity 
financiers. SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) for used for data analysis. 
Between June 2006 and May 2009, 29 interviews were conducted with 31 senior 
participants in six projects covering five sectors: hospitals, prisons roads, schools and social 
housing.   Participants included SPV managing directors, senior managers at private equity 
firms and senior directors from banks. Between February and June 2009, eight survey 
respondents were randomly selected for follow-up interviews to further explore issues raised 
by the questionnaire but also to better understand the context of and rationale for the 
respondents‟ replies.  
Interviews were mostly semi-structured in nature but towards the end of the interview 
supplementary structured questions were used to pick up any outstanding issues. Interviews 
were tape recorded, transcribed, and coded for analysis using Nvivo.  Initially, codes were 
identified from key themes in the literature, but these were later extended to add new themes 
identified by the interviewees, such as sector specific risks and the role of agents. 
For the purpose of analysis, transcripts were read several times to extract themes but 
also to understand the context of each coded section. Our interpretation has recourse to 
common perceptions across several interviewees but also to different perspectives. We 
triangulated key themes across secondary data sources to identify contrasting viewpoints and 
reduce the possibility for bias.  
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Interviews were anonymised with the following codes.  Interviewees coded SD 1–8 are 
employed by institutions supplying mostly senior debt, E 1–7 are from equity providers, and 
CE 1-8 are from organisations providing both equity and either construction or facilities 
management services.  PS 1-8 are public sector employees.  
 
4. Factors challenging the sustainability of PFI  
Although there is a long history of companies raising project finance, the PFI market was 
innovative because of the lengthy contracts involving finance for 30 or more years. 
Respondents reported their memories of the early market place as an environment 
characterised by significant uncertainty about the types and nature of risks and the likely risk-
return rewards. Evaluation models to assess these new projects had to be developed, and 
initially there was concern about their robustness. However, as the industry matured, 
understanding of risk and its evaluation grew, evaluation models standardised, and a broad 
range of risks were mitigated to limit the financiers‟ risk. Typically, SPV risks were assigned 
to subcontractors or insured and debt products became commodified. Changes in the industry 
were those normally associated with growth, as, for example, the increase in primary 
investment funds and the development of a secondary market allowing investors to exit.  
But then the market place for PFI was hit by a number of inter-related factors which 
challenged its sustainability.  This new environment was characterised by less competition, 
higher costs and was generally less receptive to PFI.  However, as governments‟ policy 
continued to favour private finance solutions to the supply of public services and 
infrastructure a number of interventions were made.  These challenging factors and the 
related interventions, which are each discussed in turn, include: (a) the banking crisis and the 
impact on the supply of finance with knock on effects in terms of rising interest rates; (b) 
private sector returns and risks; (c) problems inherent in the PFI model; and (d) the change in 
accounting regulations and forthcoming austerity packages. 
 
(a) The banking crisis and the supply of finance  
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a number of significant economic factors, such 
as asset price inflation, disparities in current accounts, high leverage and credit becoming less 
easily available, triggered the crisis worldwide (Claessens et al., 2010).  A huge deficit 
between bank loans and deposits resulted (Thorhallsson and Kirby, 2012: 802).  Governments 
suffered reduced access to risk free borrowing (Toms et al., 2011) or were unable to raise 
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funds on international markets, and together with budgetary pressures and poor regulation 
this contributed to many countries‟ economic and financial problems.   
The global crisis led to significant debate about risk management in the banking sector, 
which resulted in considerable revision of regulatory frameworks and caused a decrease in 
the number of lenders to PFI projects (Vásquez and Federico, 2012). Some institutions left 
the market place completely.  The market, which was already characterised by limited 
competition because of structural issues such as level of bid costs and time taken for 
procurements, (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005) became `even less competitive‟ (SD6). Another 
outcome of the crisis was that many operational PPP projects had to be rescued by 
Governments around the world (Claessens et al., 2010; Crotty, 2009), which in turn adversely 
affected the availability of credit for this market (Farquharson and Encinas, 2010; Connolly 
and Wall, 2011; Ang and Marchal, 2013). 
Regulatory changes also had a negative effect on funding for infrastructure investment. 
These measures include the EU‟s Solvency II Directive, which has implications for insurance 
firms, and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive for asset managers (Ang and 
Marchal, 2013).  As of January 2008, the Basel II requirements, which are obligatory for 
lenders subject to the Capital Requirements Directive, have caused much debate (CML, 
2008).  While it is the stated intention that overall capital requirements should remain largely 
unchanged (BIS, 2004), concern has been raised that they may not only reduce the 
availability of senior debt but they may also affect its pricing.  
This was followed by the introduction of Basel III which was approved in 2010 by the 
G20 following the financial crisis (BIS, 2010).  It was intended to reconfigure the approach to 
regulatory and risk matters (PwC, 2011a) in the financial sector, in an effort to ease future 
economic shocks (KPMG, 2011).  That is, its primary aim is to improve financial stability 
and to strengthen capital and liquidity requirements so that governments will not have to bail 
out banks in the future (PwC, 2011a).  KPMG (2011) and Burke and Demirag (2015) argue 
that  Basel III is expected to impact on the lending capacity of banks with the liquidity ratio 
requirements exerting pressure on the ability of banks to engage in short term lending. Vecchi 
et al. (2013) contend that this also has implications for banks‟ lending to PFI equity 
providers, because much of the equity is in practice subordinated debt.  For example, the 
Basel III‟s stability ratios are likely to make PFI loans more expensive (HM Treasury, 2012). 
It will also limit banks‟ long term lending to PFI projects because there must be  matching of 
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the liabilities and assets on  banks‟ balance sheets inevitably resulting in shorter-term debt 
with more expensive ratchets and refinancing requirements (PwC, 2011b). 
Furthermore, the credit crunch essentially wiped out the mono-line insurer credit 
enhancement market. Previously a triple A rated mono-line wrap reduced the cost of debt for 
PFI projects that typically otherwise attracted low investment grade BBB or BBB minus.  
The mono-line carried the credit risk of the project, but there was sufficient arbitrage between 
the price charged by the mono-line and the reduced cost of debt to the borrower.  Post credit 
crunch the mono-lines were unable to create this arbitrage benefit (Demirag et al., 2010).  In 
practice, both bond and bank finance were restricted substantially (Wagenvoort et al., 2010). 
Attitudes to risk also changed. Those players who remained in the market were more 
cautious about financing deals.  For example, interviewees explained that before the crisis 
one lead bank was likely to lend all the senior debt, perhaps seeking syndication after 
financial close, whereas post crisis deals could only be closed if a number of banks would 
each lend a proportion of the total debt.  
We have got a syndicate of maybe four or five banks…pre-credit crunch is all about 
competition, driving down markets and so on…  Post-credit crunch you have got the 
situation where pricing is well above what it used to be and is always going to cost you 
more to go through refinancing… 
Contracting equity and pure equity investors agreed with PwC‟s (2011b) assessment that 
banks were reluctant to lend long term. A typical quote suggests up to ten years:  
Banks are looking to lend typically seven, eight, no more than ten years. (E5) 
But even some debt holders recognised that this creates a mismatch between the project‟s 
length and financing:   
A lot of banks are pulling away, saying that we can’t lend that long anymore and it 
creates a bit of a quandary because when you have got a 25year concession and a bank 
says, well we are only going to lend over seven years, it just doesn’t make sense, you 
know the finances just don’t stack up to make it an affordable project. Seven years and 
25 leaving a gap. (SD1) 
However, not all senior debt lenders necessarily agreed that there was a problem.  For 
example, SD6 argued that banks could still lend over the longer term in the right conditions 
but he accepted that refinancing would probably occur between seven and ten years into 
projects. While this time frame necessarily creates additional risk for equity investors, the 
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refinancing risk may also affect the public sector.  Thus, the market environment has reverted 
to earlier times with re-negotiations during the PFI lifecycle:  
We all hope that in the next seven years the banking markets will come back to some 
degree of normality, but the risk is that they may not... So there is a risk there that we 
didn’t have before... we are taking lots of downside risk on the ability to be able to 
refinance in the future. (E5) 
If refinancing was difficult a cash sweep would follow, entailing reduced returns for equity 
because the public sector would probably only share a proportion of this loss. 
The nervousness about long-term lending in an uncertain market together with lack of 
competition inevitably affected loan pricing: 
The length of a loan has now become a very important part of the pricing because 
banks are getting much more nervous about long-term lending. Because there is just 
more uncertainty about finance and the future (SD1). 
Interest costs for PFI projects increased (Farquharson and Encinas, 2010).  According to a 
House of Commons (2010) report, finance costs for PFI increased by up to 33% in 2009, 
impacting considerably on value for money (NAO, 2010), and increasing unitary payments 
compared to deals negotiated before the credit crisis (NAO, 2011).  Although there must be 
questions about whether questionnaire respondents will accurately report the margins they 
achieve on PFI deals, the comparison between reported margins before and after the financial 
crisis does offer some insight.  About two thirds of survey respondents were originally 
declaring margins in the range of 60 to 100 basis points on LIBOR (refer to Table 1), but at 
the later interviews respondents were declaring a range of 200 to 250 basis points as the 
credit crunch took effect. 
Table 2: Average margin over LIBOR for debt, or spread over GILTS for bonds as 
declared by respondents  
 % 
100 + basis points 
80 < 100 basis points 
60 < 80 basis points 
40 < 60 basis points 
20 < 40 basis points 
Less than 20 basis points 
16.7  
41.6 
25.0 
8.3 
4.2 
4.2 
Total  100.0 n=24 
Mode 80 < 100 basis points 
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However, margins are affected by both the sector and the nature of the project: 
…that is very project specific. I would say that you would expect a lower rate of return 
for that simple schools deal transaction …to what might be a prison transaction where 
you are taking more operating risk. Within a certain margin there is some movement 
but it is not huge in PFI terms. (SD2) 
But concern was also reported that the government had failed to negotiate with the banks to 
assist PFI lending, so that an estimated £1billion was added to contract prices over 30 years 
for 35 affected projects (House of Commons, 2010).  This House of Commons report also 
pointed out failings that suggest a lack of control by HM Treasury.  For example, it noted that 
the Treasury did not have full information on project financing costs during the credit crisis, 
and recommended that if PFI projects with low operating costs could be unbundled from their 
high financing costs and refinanced then the Government should be able to claw back some 
£400 million.   
 
Government interventions (i) - The commitment to private finance 
Early in the financial crisis the extant Labour government responded to the perceived lack of 
supply of finance by encouraging the European Investment Bank to hold more risk and to 
lend more, faster (HM Treasury, 2008).  However, this was not particularly successful as 
there was over reliance on expensive bank finance and limited efforts to obtain more 
competitive finance from the European Investment Bank (House of Commons Treasury 
Committee, 2011). There is evidence that the credit crunch delayed the signing of new 
projects (Connolly and Wall, 2011), even though in the UK the extant Labour government 
sought to reverse the recessionary downturn by bringing forward capital spending.  This may 
be because in practice it is difficult to quicken up investment, especially in sectors where 
planning permission is likely to be disputed.  
In March 2009, the Labour government intervened with a temporary but politically 
controversial initiative that made available public money if private finance was not available 
on acceptable terms (House of Commons, 2009).   Over a period of 12 months, between £1bn 
and £2bn (Leitch, 2009) was available to all PFI projects in procurement securing the future 
of a £13bn pipeline (Millett, 2009).  The International Monetary Fund warned that such 
interventions should be contingent on circumstances so that moral hazard is avoided and 
justified on economic grounds only to support wider fiscal policy (Burger et al., 2009). 
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The change of government in 2010 brought significant uncertainty as the incoming 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition moved quickly to implement its deficit reduction 
agenda at the same time as it also sought means to ease the raising of private finance.  It 
abolished the PFI-credit scheme, which provided a financial incentive to use this form of 
financing, arguing that this would create a level playing field for all forms of public-sector 
procurements. It also announced reductions in public spending, cancelled some on-going 
capital expenditure, for example the Building Schools for the Future programme was 
terminated, and constrained new capital expenditure.  But this was paralleled with attempts to 
encourage private financiers to commit resources through initiatives such as risk-
underpinning, and temporary capital contributions (HM Treasury, 2012).   
In 2011 the government launched an enquiry involving, it said, a broad spectrum of PFI 
stakeholders, into the value for money in the existing PFI model (HM Treasury, 2011). 
Despite the uncertainty in the PFI financing market and confirmatory suggestions in 
academic literature that PFI‟s future was uncertain (Hodges and Mellet, 2012) because of 
increased credit risks and costs, this enquiry essentially led to HM Treasury reaffirming its 
commitment to using private finance.  However, HM Treasury did concede the desirability of 
change (Treasury, 2012), a point we will return to later. 
 
(b) Private sector returns and risks   
There is only limited information about investors‟ rewards and risks from PFI projects in the 
public domain.  Information about rewards may be gleaned from a small number of academic 
papers (for example, Acerete et al.,2010; Shaoul et al., 2011), which calculate the return to 
date on specific projects but which carry the caveat that the projects have a long time to run, 
and from National Audit Office reports.  This latter source has examined rewards on some 
individual projects, but in 2012 the NAO published aggregated results from a survey across 
118 PFI operational projects.  The NAO reported that investors in 71% of these projects 
responded that their returns were equal to or greater than anticipated rates of return and that 
of these 43% were forecasting significant improvements over initial expectations (NAO, 
2012).  Overall across some 700 PFI projects, investors have lost their investment or had to 
inject more capital in only a few projects and indeed the NAO noted that there can be 
reputation risks to private sector partners when high returns become public.   
The NAO indicated that the government is perceived as a very safe client to do business 
with, and in any event the risks equity investors have been subjected to so far have been 
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limited as risks are often passed on to contractors by means of fixed price contracts (NAO, 
2012).  Furthermore, as the PFI market matured and stabilised firms gained repeat businesses, 
which reduced their risk (Toms et al., 2011).   However, this NAO report also pointed out the 
importance of equity investors as risk takers.  In addition to project related risks these 
investors are also subject to risks associated with whether the bids will be successful, whether 
their selected contractors fail or persistently underperform and that the life cycle costs will be 
greater than anticipated.   
One specific risk that caused uncertainty when the early PFI projects reached financial 
close, was how investors might be able to exit these investments.  For some, the ability to exit 
was important.  About 20% of our questionnaire respondents signalled their intention to exit 
before the end of the PFI term and only about two thirds definitely intended to commit over 
the whole life of the PFI.  Despite the initial uncertainty, prior to 2007 a reasonably settled 
secondary market had evolved, in which equity could be sold to new investors or specialist 
secondary market funds (PwC, 2008).  Indeed, a study carried out by the European Services 
Strategy Unit (ESSU) (2011) indicated that the sale of equity in PFI companies rose rapidly 
during the 2000s and showed that sales actually increased through the global financial crisis.   
However, although the secondary market was growing, some equity investors were 
inclined to hold the investment, at least for a period.  A senior debt provider explained: 
Everybody is trying to get a share of the primary equity…it’s the top of the food chain. 
The contractors are now realising how valuable this equity is and might sit on it for a 
while, and then sell it (SD5)   
Others reported their desire to generate a reputation for holding their shares in PFI. By way of 
example, CE4‟s advertising literature states it has not sold PFI shares, and E1 explained his 
firm takes a long term investment perspective and would not normally sell PFI shares.  But, 
when pressed further, he agreed that the firm had sold eight PFI projects at, what he 
explained was, „an extraordinary moment in our history‟ (E1). 
Investors‟ returns quickly became a controversial element of this industry, when the 
earliest deals were refinanced giving primary investors substantial benefits but in some cases 
increasing the projects‟ risks for the public sector (Edwards et al., 2004). The refinancing 
benefit was possible, because, especially in the early years of PFI, the construction phase was 
often perceived to be high risk.  Therefore after construction, PFIs that were demonstrating 
good operational performance could be profitably refinanced.   
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Furthermore, the financiers explained that as the industry matured interest rates became 
lower than those fixed on the earliest projects because the industry was gaining experience of 
PFI.  Refinancing was therefore profitable: 
You refinanced it – basically you could make a big profit, and the equity made a big 
profit out of it, and the banks were happy to recycle because they were just given their 
money back. (CE2) 
As the bond and senior debt markets matured, it also became possible to refinance to raise 
loans or fix interest rates that initially could only be fixed for perhaps ten years: 
As the PFIs become more mature … the capital market has become more efficient, 
such that you can borrow thirty year money against a thirty year project. In the early 
deals interest rates could not be fixed for thirty years, they could only be fixed for 
maybe ten years. (E5) 
Press reports quickly picked up on some very large benefits gained by private partners which 
in the early contracts where not shared with the public sector. At interview respondents were 
especially eager to address criticisms that early costs of finance were too high as risks were 
over estimated.  Respondents argued that high initial rates reflected deep industry uncertainty 
about risk:  
The problem is the Government has been embarrassed…when nobody knew how this 
sector was going to work, there are probably some unacceptable gains that have been 
made. But having said that those early deals were pioneering… (SD5)  
Indeed this respondent argued that the industry had not been sufficiently robust in its own 
defence:  
 I’m not really sure why they’re not more robust in defending the sector (SD 5). 
As Table 3 shows, the main objectives of selling or refinancing reported by our respondents 
were to increase the return or liquidity, and lower borrowing costs.  
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Table3: Refinancing or selling on equity in PFI Projects 
 Reasons Total Number 
refinanced 
Number 
sold on 
Increase your return 29 18 11 
Increase your liquidity 24 7 17 
To take advantage of lower borrowing 
costs 
14 14 0 
Other private sector partner request 12 5 7 
To manage your risk portfolio 11 3 8 
To lower risk profile of project being 
refinanced 
4 3 1 
Smoothing of returns 3 2 1 
Public sector partner request 2 1 1 
As a result of contract renegotiations 2 2 0 
Others 3 0 3 
Total responses n=36 n=36 N=36 
Mode  Increase 
return 
Increase 
liquidity 
 
Although most survey respondents disagreed that risks were overestimated historically, the 
early opportunities for profitable refinancing that reduced as the market matured, might 
suggest the opposite.   
 
Government interventions (ii)- Refinancing 
Political pressure about refinancing gains built up as evidence emerged that such deals 
increased public sector risks (NAO, 2000) and press stories about high returns benefiting 
investors were sometimes matched with stories about poor or reduced public services (as for 
example in the case of the Norfolk and  Norwich hospital).  The inevitable consequence was 
that government intervened, and the refinancing market was changed prior to the credit crisis 
when HM Treasury and the PFI industry reached an agreement to share any gains on these 
transactions. But this agreement did not bring as much public sector benefit as had been 
anticipated, as fewer than expected deals were refinanced.  Over 50% of questionnaire 
respondents had refinanced 10% or fewer of their projects. These financiers argue that after 
the very earliest deals, where the largest benefits were accrued, the difference between 
interest rates at financial close and in the operating phase reduced, so that there was less gain 
to be released.  In particular, they argued the potential benefits of refinancing might not 
outweigh the costs, if the public sector shared such benefits.  
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Furthermore as one interviewee explained, the higher market rates of interest after the 
credit crunch together with the transaction costs of refinancing meant that market conditions 
no longer supported the refinancing of projects: 
The competitive pressure of these transactions …means that they have already been 
priced very, very finely. And I do not see a huge opportunity to refinance in the 
future… Refinancing is an expensive exercise, with lawyers involved, with running 
financial models, and the question is, is it worthwhile for the private sector and the 
public sector, doing a refinance on a project by project basis. (SD2) 
That is, refinancing became a downside risk where previously it was a profitable and 
desirable choice.  This may however prove to be a temporary phenomenon.  While it has been 
argued that risk may be mispriced when competition is intense (Keating, 2004), the reduction 
in competition between banks may also have an effect on the price of risk, and in this case 
risk is more likely to be overpriced. Thus, if economies strengthen and senior debt becomes 
more competitive, opportunities for profitable refinancing may again occur.  
While the government‟s intervention to claim part of the refinancing gains for the 
public sector had limited success it does appear to have changed investors‟ behaviour.  Rather 
than seeking to refinance it appears they used the maturing secondary market to sell 
investments, possibly with the aim of avoiding sharing refinancing gains NAO (2006).  In the 
previous five years, just 11% of our questionnaire respondents had refinanced compared with 
28% who had sold more than half of their projects, indicating limited support for the NAO. A 
later report by the House of Commons (2010) report also suggested that the market for equity 
sales was so strong that investors might be systematically realising gains on share sales in 
preference to the politically sensitive strategy of refinancing debt. Whitfield (2012) estimated 
the value of equity transactions as £12billion between 1998 and 2012.  
The House of Commons report recommended that the Treasury should investigate 
equity sales a position supported by the ESSU, which argued that infrequent and inadequate 
Government oversight of equity sales in PFI companies by HM Treasury and the National 
Audit Office meant that the scale of equity transactions and their profitability was 
underestimated.  This report identified 240 PFI equity transactions involving 1299 PFI 
projects with an average profit of 50.6 percent average value of £10m.  The report‟s 
recommendations included more government intervention in the form of a new standard PFI 
contract, which would impose a ceiling on the level of profits from such equity sales and 
should give the public sector 50 percent of any profit above a defined amount (ESSU, 2011). 
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(c) Problems inherent in the PFI model  
The changing environment, post financial crisis also exposed flaws in the PFI model, both in 
terms of the ways that potential projects were initially evaluated, financed and managed.  
Many respondents reported that the credit crunch was not anticipated and in particular some of the 
changes it brought about were not adequately taken into consideration in financing models.  For 
example, the models, and indeed the legal contracts, assumed that the direction of price movements 
would be upwards.  This affected the evaluation of many cost variables, such as facilities management 
service prices which were expected to increase annually with inflation, however as CE7 explained the 
negative adjustment being experienced in practice had not been conceived of as a possibility.   
The crisis exposed the problems of financing projects on a very highly geared model. 
Lenders who stayed in the market after the credit crunch, sought to reduce their risk by 
demanding more equity finance in deals.   But the contracting equity providers found this to 
be especially problematic.  They argued that the secondary equity market had become less 
buoyant even if the primary equity market was not seen to be in crisis.  Furthermore, this lack 
of buoyancy was perceived by the construction equity investors to be restricting their ability 
to recycle funds (CE7 and CE2).  Although these investors make profit from both equity 
investment and the contracting work, a number of interviewees explained that their main 
interest lies in the construction work.  After the infrastructure is complete they therefore wish 
to sell the investment to support future initiatives.  However, not all shared this view.  In 
some projects these equity providers indicated that returns were sufficiently attractive to stay 
with projects.  Furthermore, compared to the shorter term investment horizon of construction 
companies, facilities management companies and private equity firms argued there was a 
reputational advantage in making a long term commitment.  
Equity investors expressed frustration at the management style of other investors.  
Equity investors perceived that they were active and closely involved with the PFI projects 
whereas senior debt holders were more passive:  
One of the failings of the PPP structure is it doesn’t create active management, it 
doesn’t create active capital, it creates static business (E3). 
While equity investors always believed that bond holders were remote, this remoteness was 
perceived to be more problematical in the more difficult post crisis environment.  Greater 
uncertainty coupled with the bond holders‟ fundamental lack of knowledge about the 
underlying projects caused them to seek more financial and other information about projects 
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and more performance guarantees.  This need for additional assurance was perceived as being 
greater than that required by equity or senior debt investors, although the regulatory changes 
affecting the banks also increased the senior debt holders‟ information requirements as their 
appetite for risk declined.  Significantly, the perception amongst equity holders was that this 
in turn increased their own exposure to risk: 
The risk has increased because of the attitudes of the banks... the risk in the deal 
hasn’t (increased) but the requirement in terms of corporate guarantees, bonding 
requirements … and the general scrutiny that they will demand... has increased the 
risk. (E5) 
 
Government interventions (iii) – The PF2 model 
The UK government again intervened in the market in particular focusing on the perceived 
lack of supply of equity finance.  It proposed a restructuring of capital components for 
consortia companies (Burke and Demirag, 2015) in which the government would be a 
minority equity co-investor (HM Treasury, 2012).  In a reformed version of PFI, known as 
PF2, government would be a minority equity co-investor and at the same time the overall 
gearing-level at about 75 % would be lower than in PFI, which was typically 90% or even 
higher. This reform was intended to strengthen partnerships and risk-management in new 
privately-financed deals and to enable access to more sources of debt and equity finance to 
improve the VFM of the financing of projects (HM Treasury, 2012).  Although PF2 has come 
in response to serious criticisms about, for example, lack of value for money, lack of 
evidence that risk actually transfers as intended by the contract and higher cost of private-
finance, the language of the new proposal suggests that alongside intentions for improving 
VFM, the change is (equally) driven by a perceived need for seeking affordable private-
finance options (Burke and Demirag, 2015).  Funding competitions were introduced for part 
of the private sector equity. The rationale was to provide a transparent market, improve 
affordability, and to encourage long term equity investors.  In particular, the deleveraging of 
the capital structure was intended as a credit enhancement to make debt more attractive to 
long term lenders. 
In 2011, a PwC (2011b) report suggested that projects should be attractive to a wider 
range of investors than previously, and that in particular institutional investors should be 
incentivised to provide the long term finance needed for infrastructure investments.  HM 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
21 
 
Treasury agreed, accepting the need for “more investors with long-term investment horizons” 
(HM Treasury, 2012: 7) that match the long term nature of infrastructure projects.  Perhaps 
because the Treasury had previously been criticised for failure to incentivise such potential 
investors (House of Commons, 2010), there was a concerted political campaign to present the 
benefits of investment in public infrastructure to new potential investors, that is, pension fund 
managers and insurance companies.  In particular, a memorandum-of-understandings was 
signed with players in the pension funds industry.  In practice some niche and boutique 
investment banks considered designing institutional project finance products, but to date there 
appears little evidence of any initiatives coming to market. 
Acknowledging the sharp increase in debt borrowing costs together with the lack of 
availability of long-term debt, the Treasury review of PFI (Treasury, 2012) noted 
government‟s response in terms of initiatives including UK and housing Guarantees, the 
setting up of the Green Investment Bank, and co-lending on projects. But the review clearly 
emphasised a shift in policy towards growth enhancing projects as opposed to, for example, 
the many health, education and prisons projects that had characterised earlier infrastructure 
projects. Notably, eligible projects for the £40bn UK Guarantees programme would come 
from the transport, communications, energy and utilities sectors. 
Finally, PF2 was to be supported by a new central unit which would manage the equity 
shares held by the public, so that the government could take a portfolio approach to its 
investments balancing risk across projects.  This represents a significant change of attitude in 
terms of the focus project finance places on the fortunes of individual projects.  
 
(d) Accounting regulations and the austerity agenda 
Accounting regulations have changed since the start of the crisis.  Of particular relevance to 
this paper are the changes that determine whether or not PFI liabilities are recorded on the 
public sector balance sheet or not.  Prior to 2009 UK government accounting followed UK 
private sector financial reporting standards, known as FRS, but in 2009 the government 
adopted IFRS, which increased the likelihood that PFI liabilities would be on public sector 
balance sheet (Heald and Georgiou, 2011).  This balance sheet treatment arguably makes 
private financing of public sector projects less attractive.  Furthermore, post crisis the UK 
government also started to publish WGA (Whole of Governments Accounts), with the first 
set published in 2009-10. The WGA include an assessment of PFI liabilities (Ahmad, 
Connolly and Demirag, 2014).  The present value of future PFI obligations, including service 
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charges, was shown as £144.6 billion (HM Treasury, 2012, p. 15), although data collection 
concerns suggest that this could be an underestimate (Shaoul, et al., 2008).  
Together these initiatives might have created a challenge to the sustainability of PFI 
because the associated liabilities are more visible. However, this challenge is reduced because 
the Eurostat rules for National Accounts establish different rules for assessing whether 
projects should appear on balance sheet. Under Eurostat rules PFI projects may remain off 
the National Accounts balance sheet, in which case the attraction of PFI remains despite the 
move to IFRS and WGA. However, the accounting rules in relation to the National Accounts 
are significant in an austerity environment in which much focus has been placed on measures 
of countries‟ indebtedness.   
Available evidence from the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) suggests that 
despite a period of austerity triggered by the financial crisis more austerity is forecast (OBR, 
2014).  For example, in its July 2014 report, the OBR identified the UK‟s Public Sector Net 
Debt (PSND), the difference between liabilities and liquid financial assets, as representing 
76% of GDP.  The projection given is that this measure will peak at 78% of GDP in 2015-
2016.  Although acknowledging that governments‟ do not normally use Public Sector Net 
Worth as a target, the OBR noted that this measure of the difference between liabilities and 
all physical and financial assets has fallen sharply from 2008 onwards, and by the end of 
2012 was a significant negative value  equal to some 13% of GDP.  
Looking further ahead the OBR‟s central projection is the likelihood that, based on 
current policies such as health and pensions spending for an aging population, the budget 
deficit will widen sufficiently over the long term to put PSND on a continuously rising 
trajectory as a share of national income. This is a position that the OBR describes as 
unsustainable.  As the government has not set a target for PSND as a proportion of GDP, it is 
not clear how this debt position might affect future austerity agendas, but the OBR suggests a 
permanent need for some combination of spending cuts and tax increases (OBR, 2014). 
In this context there is a huge challenge to government‟s ability to invest in 
infrastructure, and this is turn creates challenges in relation to PFI.  In particular, the PFI 
liabilities have their part to play in this overall message.  According to the most recently 
available WGA, capital liabilities resulting from signed PFI deals are £37billion.  However, 
significantly just £5billion of these projects are on public sector balance sheet for the 
purposes of the National Accounts.  The significance is that PSND and PSNW are calculated 
from the National Accounts.  That is much of the PFI liability is currently not counted as part 
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of the PSND. Were it to be included the OBR estimates that this would increase the PSND by 
an additional 2% of GDP.  
 In response to criticism that the Treasury may have lost control over PFI 
commitments, the government has introduced a control total of £70billion, which will apply 
for the five years between 2015/16 and 2019/20, to cover all commitments on all existing PFI 
and PF2 contracts funded by central government.  The extent to which this limit will act as a 
brake on PFI spending is unclear.  Firstly, the limit does not cover PFI expenditure beyond 
central government.  Secondly, as the OBR‟s estimate of commitments for this same period is 
currently running at £51billion, it argues that this provides „substantial headroom‟ below the 
£70billion limit for new spending (OBR, 2014 page 52).  
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
This paper has examined the changing market place for PFI financing.  This was an industry 
that was growing rapidly through the early to mid -2000s.  Early concerns about high risk and 
lack of exit strategies had been largely resolved as the industry matured.  But the credit 
crunch is perceived to have reduced competition, increased the cost of finance, and reduced 
its availability as the financiers became more risk averse.  Altogether this new environment 
led to a reduction in the numbers of projects reaching financial closure, and to a perception in 
government that lack of private sector lending capacity was a major constraint in the UK 
market. 
Initially, debt was perceived to be a greater constraint than equity as the credit crunch 
hit the UK. In particular, some industry participants perceived that debt financiers were 
unwilling to lend for the full term of the project, and that their demands for information, 
performance guarantees and oversight increased.  These demands had the knock on effect of 
increasing the risks of other members in the PFI network.  However, this changed when the 
banks began to demand a reduction in the proportion of debt to equity.  Compared to the 
previous typical level of about 90%, respondents suggested a range of between 70% and 
85%.  That is, equity investors were being pressed to increase their investment just as the 
secondary market became less buoyant, so that they were less able to recycle cash.   
This perception of a lack of capacity in the equity market probably explains why the 
PF2 model involves equity input from the public sector.  Whilst the government indicated 
that the reform of PFI was intended to develop better public-private partnerships and increase 
the transparency of PFI obligations, the PF2 model remains in many respects similar to the 
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predecessor PFI with the major exception of the equity, and thus risk, sharing by the public 
sector.  It is as yet too early to evaluate the effects of PF2 on the private finance market. This 
is an area for future research.   
In 2011 Toms et al. (2011) suggested that the financial crisis and the austerity that 
followed on could shift the political or fiscal momentum towards a cessation of the extant 
collusion between the state and the private sector in driving forward PFI.  However, this 
paper argues that the state has continued to seek resolutions to perceived or actual problems 
that are intended to be attractive to private investors.  That is, the close relationship between 
suppliers and the state remains intact. 
Refinancing appears to have changed from generating profitability and liquidity.  
Looking forward between 7 and 10 years when credit crunch deals will have to be refinanced 
there is a potential downside risk.  While primarily a problem for equity investors, knock on 
effects for the public sector could follow as previous experience shows.  For example, 
contract terms may lengthen.  For the PF2 deals the public sector as an equity investor will 
also be directly at risk in refinancing arrangements.  Again it is too early to evaluate these 
effects. 
Prior PPP literature usually treats the private sector as if it were a single entity.  But this 
paper shows that there are distinctions to be made between the senior debt lenders, those 
whose interest is as equity investors and those who both provide construction or related 
services and equity finance.   
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A changing market for PFI financing: evidence from the financiers 
 
REVIEWER’S COMMENTS: 
This is an interesting article with lots of promise. Its main arguments are that the financial / banking 
crisis had the potential to disrupt the PFI financing model in the UK which depends upon bank bond 
financing. This article takes the position that the banking crisis was less disruptive that might have 
been and this was because the UK government intervened to guarantee bond financing 
arrangements. The author(s) then employ a survey and response to questionnaires to take a 
'financiers' view of the PFI funding model and use these responses to assess the extent to which the 
PFI funding model is disrupted or at risk. 
 
AUTHORS’ REPLY: 
Thank you for this supportive comment, and for the helpful suggestions and links below. 
 
I have a number of issues with the paper which are about structure and setting things up first of all. 
That is what is the objective of the paper and how is it generally structured needs tidying up 
 
Section 1 on the Nature and development of PFI 
 
I would like the authors to set up the introduction more powerfully. The first thing is the growth in UK 
PFI projects and funding details and charts showing growth in PFI. Also the projected on-going PFI 
costs to UK Government (unitary charge) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/267590/PU1587_final.p
df 
 
AUTHORS’ REPLY: 
We have rewritten the introduction, and explained the impact of the credit crunch on the 
European PPP market.  
The significance of UK PPPs in Europe has been highlighted in section 2.   
 
 
Government departments can use PFI to leverage up their budgets without using their allotted capital 
budget—the investment is additional and not budgeted for. 
In a typical PFI project, the private sector party is constituted as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), 
which manages and finances the design, build and operation of a new facility. The financing of the 
initial capital investment (i.e. the capital required to pay transaction costs, buy land and build the 
infrastructure) is provided by a combination of share capital and loan stock from the owners of the 
SPV, together with senior debt from banks or bond-holders. The return on both equity and debt capital 
is sourced from the periodic "unitary charge", which is paid by the public authority from the point at 
which the contracted facility is available for use. 
 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtreasy/1146/1146.pdf 
 
We need to have something on the finance structure of PFIs in terms of the use of SPVs and the 
typical leverage ratio (debt to equity funding). See NAO report 2012 for the cost structure of an 
average PFI.  
 
Point about PFI as being highly leveraged which allows investors (equity) to take large profits when 
they sell on and exit from contracts. So authors also introduce the nature of the 'secondary market' 
 
AUTHORS’ REPLY: 
We have explained the structure of a typical PFI project by drawing from the House of 
Commons Treasury (2011) report. The deliberate use of high leverage to maximise return on 
equity has been noted.  
 
What is P2 and how is this designed to limit leverages returns to equity holders The structure of PF2 
curbs the ability of primary investors to generate excessive profits and, consequently, the potential for 
windfall gains on secondary market sales through measures including a mechanism to share 
unutilised funds in the lifecycle reserve, the removal of soft services where contractors have typically 
included a risk premium in the pricing and the introduction of public sector equity 
*Response to Reviewers
 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/205112/pf2_infrastructu
re_new_approach_to_public_private_parnerships_051212.pdf 
 
AUTHORS’ REPLY: 
We have discussed the 2010 Conservative-Liberal government’s new approach to PFI in terms 
of its aspirations to curb down private sector profits, immediately after discussing the use of 
SPV to manage risks and use of leverage to maximise equity returns.  
 
 
Section 3 Factors limiting/challenging the sustainability of PFI  
 
A]  The banking crisis and the role of bank finance: supply of funding and interest spreads 
Quotes and data from surveys here 
Response ..Government interventions to secure funding 
B]  The secondary market windfall gains and profits extraction ..Evidence on this  
Response…PF2 -what is this and why these regulations introduced 
C] The fact that accounting regulations have changed and so PFI risks are back on the 
Governments balance sheet (more on this) 
D] Austerity packages are not yet implemented and budget cuts of up to 20 per cent envisaged 
See table 2.11 
http://cdn.budgetresponsibility.org.uk/41298-OBR-accessible.pdf 
 Problem is that PFI is split variable between departments (some more will be more or less 
affected by austerity cutbacks) 
 Also Governments versus local authority responsibility 
 And variability in terms of capital and service cost arrangements 
 
AUTHORS’ REPLY: 
We have restructured the paper as you suggest to focus on the factors challenging the 
sustainability of PFI. This is now section 4 which has four sub-sections and specified areas of 
government intervention. Thank you in particular for the link to the PBR report which was 
helpful.   
